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Abstract
In recent years, machine learning techniques have been increasingly applied in sensi-
tive decision making processes, raising fairness concerns. Past research has shown that
machine learning may reproduce and even exacerbate human bias due to biased training
data or flawed model assumptions, and thus may lead to discriminatory actions. To coun-
teract such biased models, researchers have proposed multiple mathematical definitions
of fairness according to which classifiers can be optimized. However, it has also been
shown that the outcomes generated by some fairness notions may be unsatisfactory.
In this contribution, we add to this research by considering decision making processes
in time. We establish a theoretic model in which even perfectly accurate classifiers which
adhere to almost all common fairness definitions lead to stable long-term inequalities
due to vicious cycles. Only demographic parity, which enforces equal rates of positive
decisions across groups, avoids these effects and establishes a virtuous cycle, which leads
to perfectly accurate and fair classification in the long term.
Automatic decision-making via machine learning classifiers carries the promise of quicker,
more accurate, and more objective decisions because automatic mechanisms do not foster
animosity against any group [Munoz et al., 2016, O’Neil, 2016]. Yet, machine learning sys-
tems can indeed reproduce and exacerbate bias that is encoded in the training data or in
flawed model assumptions [Munoz et al., 2016, O’Neil, 2016, Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018,
Dwork et al., 2012]. For example, the COMPAS tool, which estimates the risk of recidivism
of defendants in the US law system prior to trial, has been found to have higher rates of
false positives for Black people compared to white people and has thus been called unfair
[Angwin et al., 2016]. Similarly, a tool developed by Amazon to rate the résumés of job appli-
cants assigned higher scores to men compared to women because successful applicants in the
past had mostly been male [Dastin, 2018]. Finally, multiple machine-learning-based credit
scoring systems have emerged that reproduce historical biases and systematically assign lower
credit scores to members of disenfranchised minorities [O’Dwyer, 2018].
In general, we consider scenarios where individuals i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} in some population
of size m apply for some positive outcome, such as a pre-trial bail, a job, or a loan, and a
gatekeeper institution decides whether to grant that outcome, with the interest of accepting
only those individuals who will “succeed” with that outcome, e.g. not commit a crime, succeed
∗Funding by the CITEC center of excellence (EXC 277) is gratefully acknowledged.
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in their job for the company, or pay back a loan. To make that decision, the institution employs
a binary classifier f : {1, . . . ,m} → {0, 1} that predicts whether to grant the outcome, i.e.
f(i) = 1, or not, i.e. f(i) = 0. Now, let yi ∈ {0, 1} denote whether an individual will succeed
(yi = 1) or not (yi = 0). Then, the aim of the classifier is to maximize the share of the
population where f(i) = yi.
In our examples, we care how a certain protected group C is treated compared to ev-
eryone else. In general, we assume these protected groups to be pre-defined by society,
e.g. via the EU charter of fundamental rights, which forbids discrimination based on sex,
race, color, ethnic or social origin, religion, political opinion, and several other features
[for Fundamental Rights, 2012]. Formally, let C ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be a protected group, let
mc := |C|, let ¬C := {1, . . . ,m} \ C, and let m¬c := |¬C|. Then, the fairness notion cor-
responding to our last two examples is demographic parity, which requires that the rate of
positive decisions is equal across groups, i.e.
∑
i∈C
f(i)
mc
=
∑
i∈¬C
f(i)
m¬c
[Dwork et al., 2012,
Žliobaite˙, 2017].
Multiple authors have criticized demographic parity because it decreases accuracy if the
base rate of successful people is different across groups [Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018, Žliobaite˙,
2017, Hardt et al., 2016]. Accordingly, Hardt et al. have proposed the notion of equalized odds
which only requires an equal rate of positive decisions among the people who will succeed and
the people who will not succeed [Hardt et al., 2016], which corresponds to the fairness notion
in the COMPAS example [Angwin et al., 2016].
In addition distributive justice considerations, several authors have proposed notions of
due process, in the sense that any classifier should be considered fair which performs decisions
in a fair way [Grgić-Hlača et al., 2016]. In particular, several authors have argued that classi-
fiers should not use features that code the protected group directly or indirectly [O’Neil, 2016,
Dwork et al., 2012, Grgić-Hlača et al., 2016, Kilbertus et al., 2017, Kusner et al., 2017]. Al-
ternatively, Corbett and Goel have proposed a two-step classification process. First, a function
g : {1, . . . ,m} → R assigns a risk score to each individual, which should increase monotonously
with the probability to be successful, i.e. g(i) = σ(P (yi = 1)) for some monotonous function σ
(a property also called calibration [Liu et al., 2018]). Second, the actual classifier only thresh-
old the risk score, i.e. f(i) = 1 if g(i) ≥ θ and f(i) = 0 otherwise for some fixed threshold
θ ∈ R, thus holding everyone to the same standard [Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018].
In this contribution, we argue that even if a classifier is perfectly accurate and is fair
according to all fairness notions except demographic parity, we may still obtain undesirable
long-term outcomes. To do so, we establish a simple dynamical system which assumes that
positive classifier decisions have positive impact on the future success rate of a group, which in
turn leads to a higher chance for positive classifications and so on. We show that this positive
feedback loop implies stable equilibria where a protected group receives no positive decisions
anymore. We also show that imposing demographic parity breaks this feedback loop and
introduces a single, stable equilibrium which exhibits perfect accuracy, equality, and fairness
according to all notions.
Our model is inspired by prior work of O’Neil, who has investigated existing automatic de-
cision making systems and found positive feedback loops which disadvantage protected groups
[O’Neil, 2016]. However, O’Neil did not provide a theoretic model. Further, our work is re-
lated to prior research by Liu et al., who have analyzed one-step dynamics in a credit scoring
scenario [Liu et al., 2018] but did not consider long-term outcomes. Third, Hu and Chen
have previously analyzed a detailed economic model of the labor market, including long-term
dynamics [Hu and Chen, 2018] and found that demographic parity leads to a desirable equi-
librium. Finally, Mouzannar et al. generalized this work simultaneously and independently
to us and analyzed a wide range of scenarios where acceptance decisions influence future
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qualifications [Mouzannar et al., 2019]. Our work is similar to theirs, but we use a different
model assuming continuous qualification variables, fixed institutional resources, and specific
dynamics, which enables us to derive stronger conclusions.
1 Model
In our model, we assume that every individual i has an objective risk score qti at time t
which is drawn from an exponential distribution1 with mean µtc if i ∈ C and with mean µt¬c
otherwise. Further, we assume that the n ≤ m people with the highest score in each iteration
are the ones which will be successful, i.e. yi = 1 if and only if qti is among the top n at
time t. Accordingly, we obtain a perfectly accurate classifier if we use the scoring function
gt(i) = qti and set the decision threshold θ
t such that exactly the top n scores are above or
equal to it. Note that our hypothetical classifier conforms to equalized odds because there
are no misclassifications [Hardt et al., 2016], fulfills the calibration, threshold, and accuracy
requirements of Corbett and Goel [Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018], and does not need access
to the group label, neither directly nor indirectly, thus conforming to all due process notions
of fairness [O’Neil, 2016, Dwork et al., 2012, Grgić-Hlača et al., 2016, Kilbertus et al., 2017,
Kusner et al., 2017].
We estimate the overall number of people who receive a positive classification inside and
outside the protected group via the expected values E[
∑
i∈C f(i)] = mc ·
∫
∞
θt
1
µtc
·exp(− q
µtc
)dq =
mc · exp(− θtµtc ) and E[
∑
i∈¬C f(i)] = m¬c · exp(− θ
t
µt
¬c
)2.
We finally assume that the mean for a group improves with a higher rate of positive
classifier decisions in the previous time step according to the following equation.
(
µt+1c
µt+1
¬c
)
= (1− α) ·
(
µtc
µt
¬c
)
+ β ·
(
exp(− θt
µtc
)
exp(− θt
µt
¬c
)
)
(1)
where the decision threshold θt is selected as the numeric solution to the equation n =
mc · exp(− θtµtc ) +m¬c · exp(−
θt
µt
¬c
), where the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the score fruction
an individual loses in each time step (“leak reate”), and where the parameter β ∈ R+ quantifies
the score an individual gains for for a positive classifier decision. Figure 1 (left) visualizes the
dynamical system.
Note the connections of our model to the real-world examples mentioned before. In credit
scoring, qti would correspond to the credit score, i.e. the capability of an individual to pay back
a loan. We would plausibly assume that the score increases with positive classifier decisions
because individuals who get a loan have additional financial resources at their disposal and
can use those to add wealth to their group [Liu et al., 2018]. Further, we would assume a
nonzero leak rate α because individuals need to cover their expenses which may negatively
affect their capability to pay back a loan.
If we apply our model to pre-trial bail assessment, the score qti would assess the likelihood
of a defendant to not commit a crime until trial. Here, we would assume that the score
decreases with negative classifier decisions because incarcerating people from a community
1Note that our qualitative results can be generalized to other distributions, such as Gaussian or Pareto. We
select the exponential distribution here because it only has a single parameter and thus is easier to analyze.
You can find the full analysis in Appendix A.
2We consider each classifier decision as a Bernoulli trial with success probability P =
∫
∞
θt
1
µt
c
· exp(− q
µt
c
)dq,
yielding a binomially distributed random variable
∑
i∈C f(i) with expected value mc ·P and variance mc ·P ·
(1−P ). Note that the variance gets close to zero if P is small itself, such that the expected value is a precise
estimate for sufficiently small n.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the dynamical system model from Equation 1 for a population
with mc = 100, m¬c = 200, n = 50 successful people, leak rate α = 0.5, and score β =
5. Equilibria are highlighted with circles. Left: The model without demographic parity
requirement, exhibiting undesirable stable equilibria at the coordinate axes. Right: The
model with demographic parity, exhibiting a single stable equilibrium on the diagonal.
may cut social ties and deteriorate trust in the state, leading to a higher crime rate [O’Neil,
2016]. This effect can be modeled by a nonzero leak rate α and a positive score β.
Also note that our model is not necessarily realistic but shows that there exist contexts
where even perfect classifiers can exhibit stable long-term inequality. We show that context
can matter, not that every context conforms to our model.
If we analyze the equilibria of this system, we first note that limµtc→0 µ
t+1
c = limµtc→0(1−
α) · µtc + β · exp(− θ
t
µtc
) = 0, i.e. µ∗c = 0 is a fix point. Further, limµ∗c→0 exp(− θ
∗
µ∗c
) = 0, i.e. no
person from the protected group is above the threshold at that fix point. Accordingly, we can
compute the fix point threshold θ∗ only for the non-protected group, i.e. θ∗ = µ∗
¬c · log(m¬cn ).
By plugging this into the fix point equation µ∗
¬c = (1 − α) · µ∗¬c + β · exp(− θ
∗
µ∗¬c
) we obtain
µ∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m¬c
, which yields µ∗
¬c = 2.5 for our example in Figure 1 (left). At this fix point, we
obtain a Jacobian of Equation 1 which is 1−α times the identity matrix, i.e. both eigenvalues
have an absolute value < 1 for α > 0, implying stability. In Figure 1 (left) we also see that
the basin of attraction is the entire region above the diagonal, i.e. whenever we start with
slight inequality in favor of the non-protected group, this inequality will get amplified.
In summary, we have shown that, for our exponential distribution model, there are al-
ways undesirable and stable equilibria in which µtc degenerates to zero and the non-protected
group receives all positive outcomes. This begs the question: Can we break this undesirable
dynamic? Indeed, we can, using demographic parity.
2 Demographic Parity Dynamics
Demographic parity requires equal acceptance rates across groups, i.e. exp(− θtc
µtc
) = exp(− θt¬c
µt
¬c
) =
P for some acceptance rate P and group-specific thresholds θtc and θ
t
¬c. We obtain P as solu-
tion of the threshold equation n = mc · P +m¬c · P , i.e. P = nmc+m¬c = nm . By plugging this
result into our fix point equation we obtain µ∗ = µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c = (1−α) ·µ∗+β ·P = βα · nm , which
yields µ∗ = 5/3 for our example in Figure 1 (right). For this fix point we obtain a Jacobian
of Equation 1 of 1− α times the identity matrix, implying stability.
Overall, demographic parity ensures that the mean for every group converges to the same
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point, such that the thresholds θtc and θ
t
¬c become equal as well. This, in turn, implies that
selecting the top-scored people in each group corresponds to selecting the top-scored people
in the entire population, implying a classifier that is perfectly accurate and conforms to all
notions of fairness, including demographic parity.
3 Conclusion
In this contribution, we have analyzed a simple dynamic model for automatic decision making.
In particular, our model assumes that people should receive a positive classifier decision only
if their objective risk score is in the top, that the means of the score distribution differ
between the protected group and everyone else, and that positive decisions improve the mean
for the group in the next time step. This feedback loop becomes a vicious cycle in which
even a perfectly accurate classifier conforming to almost all fairness notions leads to stable
inequality. Fortunately, we can break this vicious cycle by imposing democratic parity which
instead leads to an equilibrium with perfectly accurate, equal, and fair classification.
At present, our analysis is limited to a theoretical model assuming an exponential distri-
bution and a simple dynamic model. However, we note that generalizations to other distribu-
tions are possible. Further, we note that our findings are consistent with practical application
scenarios [O’Neil, 2016] and other theoretic studies [Hu and Chen, 2018, Mouzannar et al.,
2019].
Overall, we conclude that our findings give reason to re-think notions of fairness in terms
of mid- and long-term outcomes and reconsider demographic parity as a helpful intervention
whenever decision making systems are embedded in vicious cycles. Otherwise, even well-
intended and well-constructed systems may stabilize and exacerbate inequality.
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A Generalized Setup
In this appendix, we generalize our argument from the main paper to general probability
densities. Further, we perform the stability analysis in more detail for three common proba-
bility distributions, namely the exponential distribution (Section A.4), the Pareto distribution
(Section A.5), and the Gaussian distribution (Section A.6).
Our generalized setup is as follows. We assume a population with m individuals, a subset
of which belong to a protected group C ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. We denote the size of the protected
group as mc = |C| and the size of the non-protected group as m¬c = m−mc. We generally
assume that 0 < mc < m¬c < m.
Further, we assume that every individual i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} has an objective risk score qti at
time t, which is a real-valued random variable that is distributed according to some density
ptc if i ∈ C or according to some density pt¬c if i ∈ ¬C. Note that these densities may change
over time and are thus indexed with the time step t. Further, we assume that an individual i
is successful, i.e. yi = 1, if and only if qti is among the top n scores at time t. We also assume
that 0 < n≪ mc, i.e. an acceptance is rare.
Under these assumptions, the following classifier f t : {1, . . . ,m} → {0, 1} is per construc-
tion perfectly accurate.
f t(i) =
{
1 if gt(i) ≥ θt
0 otherwise
where
gt(i) = qti
θt s.t. |{i|qti ≥ θt}| = n
In other words, we predict success for individual i at time t by first assigning the risk score
qti and then applying a threshold that only leaves the top n people, i.e. exactly those who
actually will be successful.
Note that this classifier is not only perfectly accurate but also conforms to equalized
odds because we do not misclassify anyone, such that the rate of misclassifications is equal
among all groups [Hardt et al., 2016]. Further, the scoring function is calibrated, the classifier
is as accurate as possible, and it applies the same threshold for everyone, such that the
fairness constraints of Corbett-Davies and Goel [2018] are fulfilled. Finally, the classifier
fulfills notions of due process because it only accesses the objective risk score and makes no
use of any other features of the individual [O’Neil, 2016, Dwork et al., 2012, Grgić-Hlača et al.,
2016, Kilbertus et al., 2017, Kusner et al., 2017].
Next, we consider the probability of a person inside our outside the protected group to
be classified as successful at time t, which is both equivalent to the probability of being
successful at time t and to the probability of having a score above or equal to the threshold θt
at time t. We denote this probability as P tc for the protected group and P
t
¬c otherwise. These
probabilities are given as follows.
P tc =
∫
∞
θt
ptc(q)dq
P tc =
∫
∞
θt
ptc(q)dq
Given these probabilities, we can estimate the number of people inside and outside the pro-
tected group who will be successful at time t. For each individual, success at time t is an
independent Bernoulli trial with success probability P tc or P
t
¬c respectively. Accordingly, the
sums
∑
i∈C f(i) and
∑
i∈¬C f(i) are binomially distributed random variables with means
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Figure 2: An illustration of Equation 2 for n = 20, mc = 50, m¬c = 100, µtc = 2, and µ
t
¬c = 3.
The threshold θt is selected on the x-axis such that exactly the amount of probability mass
from both ptc and p
t
¬c lies on the right side of θ
t so that mc · P tc and m¬c · P t¬c add up to m.
mc · P tc as well as m¬c · P t¬c and variances mc · P tc · (1 − P tc ) as well as m¬c · P t¬c · (1 − P t¬c).
Note that the probabilities P tc with P
t
¬c decrease for lower n. Therefore, our assumption
n ≪ mc < m¬c implies that the variance is close to zero and thus the mean is a precise
estimate of the actual number of successful people.
Using our mean estimate for the number of successful people in each group, the threshold
θt can be estimated using the approximate equation
n = mc · P tc +m¬c · P t¬c. (2)
Figuratively speaking, we slide θt from right to left along the score axis until we have collected
enough probability mass from both ptc and p
t
¬c such that exactly n people are expected to
have a score above the threshold (also refer to Figure 2).
A.1 Dynamical Model
Finally, we model the dynamics of our system. Our central modeling decision is that the
means of the densities ptc and p
t
¬c shift over time. More precisely, we denote the means at
time t as µtc and µ
t
¬c, and assume the following dynamical system equation.(
µt+1c
µt+1
¬c
)
= (1− α) ·
(
µtc
µt
¬c
)
+ β ·
(
P tc
P t
¬c
)
(3)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a hyper-parameter describing how much score an individual loses in each
time step (“leak reate”), and where β ∈ R+ is a hyper-parameter describing how much score
an individual gains for for each positive classifier decision. By averaging these scores inside
and outside the protected group, we obtain Equation 3. Note that the dynamics of µtc and
µt
¬c are implicitly coupled due to the shared threshold θ
t.
Now, let us analyze the dynamic behavior of this system. In particular, we consider the
score gap between the protected group and everyone else, which we denote as ηt := µt
¬c − µtc.
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This score gap grows at time step t exactly if
ηt+1 − ηt > 0
⇐⇒ µt+1
¬c − µt+1c − µt¬c + µtc > 0
⇐⇒ (1− α) · µt
¬c + β · P t¬c − (1− α) · µtc − β · P tc − µt¬c + µtc > 0
⇐⇒ β · (P t
¬c − P tc ) > α · ηt. (4)
Conversely, the score gap shrinks at time step at t exactly if
β · (P t
¬c − P tc ) < α · ηt. (5)
From these equations, we can infer that the absolute value of the score gap will grow
if α is sufficiently small, β is sufficiently large, and the probability distribution emphasizes
gaps in the mean, i.e. small differences between means imply larger differences in probability
mass on the margins. This covers a broad range of distributions where probability mass is
concentrated around the mean.
A.2 Equilibria
Now, let us analyze the equilibria of our dynamical system. First, let us consider undesirable
equilibria with a nonzero score gap. In particular, let us assume that the protected group is
entirely unsuccessful, i.e. P ∗c = 0. Then, by virtue of Equation 2, we obtain P
∗
¬c =
n
m¬c
. The
fix point equation yields:(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
= (1− α) ·
(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
+ β ·
(
0
n
m¬c
)
⇐⇒
(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
=
(
0
β
α
· n
m¬c
)
In other words, we achieve an equilibrium if the protected group has a mean score of zero
and no success whereas everybody else has a mean score of β
α
· n
m¬c
and success probability
n
m¬c
. For many probability distributions, we can assume that probabilities remain unaffected
by small deviations in the score gap. Therefore, we can demonstrate stability as follows.
First, assume that the score gap is slightly larger compared to the equilibrium. In this
case, we obtain:
α · ηt > α · (µ∗
¬c − µ∗c) = α ·
β
α
· n
m¬c
= β · n
m¬c
= β · (P ∗
¬c − P ∗c ) ≈ β · (P t¬c − P tc )
which in turn implies by virtue of Equation 5 that the score gap will shrink again. Second,
assume that the score gap is slightly smaller compared to the equilibrium. In this case, we
obtain:
α · ηt < α · (µ∗
¬c − µ∗c) = α ·
β
α
· n
m¬c
= β · n
m¬c
= β · (P ∗
¬c − P ∗c ) ≈ β · (P t¬c − P tc )
which in turn implies by virtue of Equation 4 that the score gap grows again. Overall, the
dynamical system counteracts small deviations, implying stability.
Next, we consider the desirable case, where success probabilities become equal across
groups, i.e. P ∗c = P
∗
¬c = P
∗. Then, Equation 2 yields n = P ∗ ·mc + P ∗ ·m¬c, which implies
P ∗ = n
m
. Accordingly, the fix point equation yields:
(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
= (1− α) ·
(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
+ β ·
(
P ∗
P ∗
)
⇐⇒
(
µ∗c
µ∗
¬c
)
=
(β
α
· n
m
β
α
· n
m
)
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In other words, the mean for both groups has the same value µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m
. Unfortunately,
this point is not stable in general, because a slight nonzero score gap will, for many proba-
bility distributions, result in emphasized gaps in success probability, which in turn may fulfill
Equation 4 or 5, leading to even more pronounced score gaps (as we will show in Sections A.4,
A.5, and A.6). To counteract this potential instability, we can employ demographic parity.
A.3 Demographic Parity
Demographic parity requires that, at any time step t, P tc = P
t
¬c, which we can re-write to
P t
¬c − P tc = 0. This, in turn, implies that Equation 4 is always fulfilled if the score gap
is negative and Equation 5 is always fulfilled if the score gap is positive. In other words,
demographic parity ensures that only states with zero score gaps can be equilibria and that
these equilibria are always stable. In case there is a one-to-one map from means to success
probabilities (as is the case in most common probability distributions), this in turn implies
that there is a unique, stable equilibrium where the score gap and the probability gap are
both zero, i.e. P ∗c = P
∗
¬c =
n
m
and µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m
.
We can also confirm the stability finding using classic stability theory. If P tc = P
t
¬c, then
Equation 2 implies that P tc = P
t
¬c =
n
m
for all time steps. Therefore, we obtain the following
Jacobian for Equation 3
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c) =
(
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · nm
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · nm
]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · nm
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · nm
]
)
=
(
1− α 0
0 1− α
)
The two eigenvalues of this matrix are both 1 − α. Therefore, for a nonzero leak rate, the
absolute value of these eigenvalues is smaller than one and therefore stability theory implies
that the equilibrium is stable. Note that this result applies independent of the probability
distribution in question and relies only on a one-to-one mapping between means and success
probabilities.
In the following sections, we consider the stability findings from the previous section
in more detail for three specific distributions, namely the exponential, the Pareto, and the
Gaussian distribution.
A.4 Stability for the Exponential Distribution
In the exponential distribution model, we assume that the densities ptc and p
t
¬c have the
following form (also refer to Figure 2).
ptc(q) =
1
µtc
· exp (− q
µtc
)
pt
¬c(q) =
1
µt
¬c
· exp (− q
µt
¬c
)
Note that the densities are fully parameterized by the respective mean, which makes the ex-
ponential distribution a straightforward object of study. For these densities, the probabilities
P tc and P
t
¬c take the following form.
P tc =
∫
∞
θt
ptc(q)dq = exp
(− θt
µtc
)
P t
¬c =
∫
∞
θt
pt
¬c(q)dq = exp
(− θt
µt
¬c
)
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Now, let us consider the undesirable equilibrium case, where µ∗c = 0 and µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m¬c
.
First, note that the threshold θt in this condition is lower-bounded due to Equation 2. In
particular, we obtain the following lower bound.
exp
(− θt
µ∗
¬c
)
= exp
(− θt · α
β
· m¬c
n
) ≤ n
m¬c
⇐⇒ −θt · α
β
· m¬c
n
≤ log ( n
m¬c
)
⇐⇒ θt ≥ −β
α
· n
m¬c
log
( n
m¬c
)
Note that this term is strictly larger than zero as n≪ m¬c, which implies that log
(
n
m¬c
)
< 0.
Accordingly, if µtc is sufficiently small, i.e. µ
t
c ≪ −βα · nm¬c log
(
n
m¬c
)
, then P tc = exp
(− θt
µtc
) ≈ 0.
Also note that small changes in µtc will not change the probability P
t
c in this case. Therefore,
for sufficiently small µtc, we obtain approximatively constant probabilities P
t
c ≈ 0 and P t¬c ≈
n
m¬c
. Accordingly, the Jacobian matrix of Equation 3 for sufficiently small µtc is given as
follows.
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c) =
(
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · 0
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · 0
]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1 − α) · µt
¬c + β · nm¬c
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · nm¬c
]
)
=
(
1− α 0
0 1− α
)
The two eigenvalues of this matrix are both 1 − α. Therefore, for a nonzero leak rate, the
absolute value of these eigenvalues is smaller than one and therefore stability theory implies
that the equilibrium is stable.
Next, let us consider the desirable equilibrium case, where µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m
and P ∗c =
P ∗
¬c =
n
m
. In this equilibrium condition, we can obtain the threshold θ∗ as follows.
n
m
= P ∗c = exp
(− θ∗
µ∗c
)
⇐⇒ log ( n
m
)
= − θ
∗
µ∗c
⇐⇒ θ∗ = −µ∗c · log
( n
m
)
Now, let us consider small deviations of µtc and µ
t
¬c such that θ
t stays equal to θ∗. Such
deviations are possible since we can let both means deviate in opposite directions such that
the condition holds. In that case, we obtain the following Jacobian of our model in Equation 3.
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c) =
(
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · exp
(− θ∗
µtc
)]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · exp
(− θ∗
µtc
)]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · exp
(− θ∗
µt
¬c
)]
∂
∂µt
¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · exp
(− θ∗
µt
¬c
)]
)
=
(
1− α+ β · exp (− θ∗
µtc
) · θ∗
(µtc)
2 0
0 1− α+ β · exp (− θ∗
µt
¬c
) · θ∗
(µt¬c)
2
)
Accordingly, the Jacobian at our equilibrium is given as follows.
J(µ∗c , µ
∗
¬c) =
(
1− α+ β · exp (− θ∗
µ∗c
) · θ∗
(µ∗c )
2 0
0 1− α+ β · exp (− θ∗
µ∗
¬c
) · θ∗
(µ∗¬c)
2
)
=
(
1− α− β · exp ( log ( n
m
)) · α
β
· m
n
· log ( n
m
)
0
0 1− α− β · exp ( log ( n
m
)) · α
β
· m
n
· log ( n
m
)
)
=
(
1− α− α · log ( n
m
)
0
0 1− α− α · log ( n
m
))
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Figure 3: Three different Pareto densities with means µ and rate parameters k as specified in
the legend.
The two eigenvalues of this Jacobian are both 1−α−α · log ( n
m
)
. Accordingly, our equilibrium
is unstable if |1− α− α · log ( n
m
)| > 1. Given that n≪ m and α ∈ [0, 1], 1− α− α · log ( n
m
)
is larger than 0. Therefore, we can re-write the instability condition as follows.
1− α− α · log ( n
m
)
> 1
⇐⇒ 1 + log ( n
m
)
< 0
⇐⇒ n
m
<
1
e
In other words, if m is at least e times larger than n, the equilibrium is unstable. From
n≪ mc < 12m, we can conclude that this is the case.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the exponential distribution yields attractive
equilibria in undesirable positions, whereas the desirable equilibria are unstable for a wide
range of conditions.
A.5 Stability for the Pareto Distribution
In the Pareto distribution model, we assume that the densities ptc and p
t
¬c have the following
form (also refer to Figure 3).
ptc(q) =
(k − 1)k
kk−1
· (µ
t
c)
k
qk+1
pt
¬c(q) =
(k − 1)k
kk−1
· (µ
t
¬c)
k
qk+1
where k > 1 controls the slope of the distribution and how much probability mass is con-
centrated around the mean. Note that the Pareto distribution is only defined on the interval
[k−1
k
· µ,∞) and that the variance is infinite for k ≤ 2.
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From these densities we obtain the following success probabilities P tc and P
t
¬c.
P tc =
∫
∞
θt
ptc(q)dq =
(k − 1
k
)k · (µtc
θt
)k
P t
¬c =
∫
∞
θt
pt
¬c(q)dq =
(k − 1
k
)k · (µt¬c
θt
)k
Plugging these results into Equation 2, we obtain a closed-form expression for the threshold
as follows.
n = mc ·
(k − 1
k
)k · (µtc
θt
)k
+m¬c ·
(k − 1
k
)k · (µt¬c
θt
)k
⇐⇒ n · (θt)k =
(k − 1
k
)k · [mc · (µtc)k +m¬c · (µt¬c)k]
⇐⇒ θt = k − 1
k
· k
√
1
n
[
mc · (µtc)k +m¬c · (µt¬c)k
]
Next, we plug this solution back into our probability expressions and obtain:
P tc =
n · (µtc)k
mc · (µtc)k +m¬c · (µt¬c)k
P t
¬c =
n · (µt
¬c)
k
mc · (µtc)k +m¬c · (µt¬c)k
Accordingly, we obtain the following Jacobian.
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c)
=

 ∂∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · n·(µ
t
c)
k
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k
]
∂
∂µt
¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · n·(µ
t
c)
k
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k
]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β
n·(µt¬c)
k
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · n·(µ
t
¬c)
k
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k
]


=

1− α+ β · k · n · (µtc)k−1 · m¬c·(µt¬c)k(mc·(µtc)k+m¬c·(µt¬c)k)2 −β · n·(µtc)k(mc·(µtc)k+m¬c·(µt¬c)k)2 ·m¬c · k · (µt¬c)k−1
−β · n·(µt¬c)k
(mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k)2
·mc · k · (µtc)k−1 1− α+ β · k · n · (µt¬c)k−1 · mc·(µ
t
c)
k
(mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k)2


=

1− α+ β·k·(µtc)k−1mc·(µtc)k+m¬c·(µt¬c)k · P t¬c − β·m¬c·k·(µt¬c)k−1mc·(µtc)k+m¬c·(µt¬c)k · P tc
− β·mc·k·(µtc)k−1
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k · P t¬c 1− α+ β·k·(µ
t
¬c)
k−1
mc·(µtc)
k+m¬c·(µt¬c)
k · P tc


Now, let us consider the undesirable equilibrium case, where µ∗c = ǫ with ǫ ≈ 03, µ∗¬c =
β
α
· n
m¬c
, P ∗c = 0, and P
∗
¬c =
n
m¬c
. For this equilibrium, we obtain the following Jacobian.
J(ǫ,
β
α
· n
m¬c
) ≈
(
1− α 0
0 1− α
)
The two eigenvalues of this matrix are both 1 − α. Therefore, for a nonzero leak rate, the
absolute value of these eigenvalues is smaller than one and therefore stability theory implies
that the equilibrium is stable.
3A mean of zero would imply an ill-defined Pareto density. Therefore, we consider here a mean close to
zero.
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Next, let us consider the desirable equilibrium case, where µ∗ = µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m
and
P ∗ = P ∗c = P
∗
¬c =
n
m
. For this equilibrium, we obtain the following Jacobian.
J(
β
α
· n
m
,
β
α
· n
m
) =

1− α+ β·k·(µ∗)k−1m·(µ∗)k · P ∗ −β·m¬c·k·(µ∗)k−1m·(µ∗)k · P ∗
−β·mc·k·(µ∗)k−1
m·(µ∗)k
· P ∗ 1− α+ β·k·(µ∗)k−1
m·(µ∗)k
· P ∗


=
(
1− α+ β·k
m
· P ∗
µ∗
−β · k · m¬c
m
· P ∗
µ∗
−β · k · mc
m
· P ∗
µ∗
1− α+ β·k
m
· P ∗
µ∗
)
=
(
1− α · [1 + k
m
] −α · k · m¬c
m
−α · k · mc
m
1− α · [1 + k
m
])
The eigenvalues of this Jacobian are λ1 = 1 − α ·
[
1 + k
m
· (1 + √mc ·m¬c)
]
and λ1 =
1 − α · [1 + k
m
· (1 + √mc ·m¬c)
]
. The absolute values of these eigenvalues exceed 1 if the
following respective conditions hold.
λ1 > 1 ⇐⇒ k > m√
mc ·m¬c − 1
λ2 < −1 ⇐⇒ k >
( 2
α
− 1) · m√
mc ·m¬c + 1
The former condition can be fulfilled easily if k > 2 and mc ≈ m¬c ≈ m2 . As such, this
equilibrium is unstable for a wide range of possible settings.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the Pareto distribution yields attractive equilibria
in undesirable positions, whereas the desirable equilibria are unstable for a wide range of
conditions.
A.6 Stability for the Gaussian Distribution
In the Gaussian distribution model, we assume that the densities ptc and p
t
¬c have the following
form:
ptc(q) = N (q|µtc, σ) =
1√
2πσ2
· exp
(
− 1
2
· (q − µ
t
c)
2
σ2
)
pt
¬c(q) = N (q|µt¬c, σ) =
1√
2πσ2
· exp
(
− 1
2
· (q − µ
t
¬c)
2
σ2
)
where N denotes the Gaussian density function and where σ is the standard deviation of the
Gaussian, which we assume to be fixed and equal across groups.
From these densities we obtain the following success probabilities P tc and P
t
¬c.
P tc =
∫
∞
θt
ptc(q)dq = 1− Φ
(θt − µtc
σ
)
P t
¬c =
∫
∞
θt
pt
¬c(q)dq = 1− Φ
(θt − µt
¬c
σ
)
where Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Now, let us consider the undesirable equilibrium case, where µ∗c = 0 and µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m¬c
.
First, note that the threshold θt is lower-bounded in this condition due to Equation 2. In
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particular, we obtain the following lower bound.
1− Φ(θt − µ∗¬c
σ
) ≤ n
m¬c
⇐⇒ θ
t − µ∗
¬c
σ
≥ Φ−1(1− n
m¬c
)
⇐⇒ θt ≥ σ · Φ−1(1− n
m¬c
)
+ µ∗
¬c
Note that this term is strictly larger than zero. Accordingly, for sufficiently small σ and small
µtc < µ
∗
¬c we obtain:
P tc = 1−Φ
(θt − µtc
σ
)
≤ 1− Φ
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m¬c
)
+
µ∗
¬c − µtc
σ
)
≤ 1−Φ
(µ∗
¬c − µtc
σ
)
≈ 1− 1 = 0
In other words, for sufficiently small σ we obtain P tc ≈ P ∗c = 0, even if we vary µtc slightly.
Accordingly, P t
¬c =
n−mc·P
∗
c
m¬c
≈ n
m¬c
= P ∗
¬c. This results in the following Jacobian matrix of
Equation 3 for small µtc, µ
t
¬c ≈ µ∗¬c and small σ.
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c) =
(
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · 0
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β · 0
]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1 − α) · µt
¬c + β · nm¬c
]
∂
∂µt¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β · nm¬c
]
)
=
(
1− α 0
0 1− α
)
The two eigenvalues of this matrix are both 1 − α. Therefore, for a nonzero leak rate, the
absolute value of these eigenvalues is smaller than one and therefore stability theory implies
that the equilibrium is stable.
Next, let us consider the desirable equilibrium case, where µ∗c = µ
∗
¬c =
β
α
· n
m
and P ∗c =
P ∗
¬c =
n
m
. In this equilibrium condition, we can obtain the threshold θ∗ as follows.
n
m
= P ∗c = 1− Φ
(θ∗ − µ∗c
σ
)
⇐⇒ θ
∗ − µ∗c
σ
= Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)
⇐⇒ θ∗ = Φ−1(1− n
m
) · σ + µ∗c
Now, let us consider small deviations of µtc and µ
t
¬c which are such that the threshold θ
t stays
equal to θ∗. In that case, we obtain the following Jacobian of our model in Equation 3.
J(µtc, µ
t
¬c) =
(
∂
∂µtc
[
(1− α) · µtc + β ·
(
1− Φ(θ∗−µtc
σ
)
)]
∂
∂µt
¬c
[
(1− α) · µtc + β ·
(
1− Φ(θ∗−µtc
σ
)
)]
∂
∂µtc
[
(1 − α) · µt
¬c + β ·
(
1− Φ(θ∗−µt¬c
σ
)
)]
∂
∂µt
¬c
[
(1− α) · µt
¬c + β ·
(
1− Φ(θ∗−µt¬c
σ
)
)]
)
=
(
1− α− β · N (θ∗|µtc, σ) 0
0 1− α− β · N (θ∗|µt
¬c, σ)
)
Accordingly, the Jacobian at our equilibrium is given as follows.
J(µ∗c , µ
∗
¬c) =
(
1− α− β · N (θ∗|µ∗c , σ) 0
0 1− α− β · N (θ∗|µ∗
¬c, σ)
)
=

1− α− β · N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
) · σ∣∣∣0, σ) 0
0 1− α− β · N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
) · σ∣∣∣0, σ)


=

1− α− βσ · N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1) 0
0 1− α− β
σ
· N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1)


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The two eigenvalues of this Jacobian are both 1−α− β
σ
· N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1). Accordingly,
our equilibrium is unstable if |1 − α − β
σ
· N
(
Φ−1
(
1 − n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1)| > 1. Given that α, β, and
the Gaussian density function are all non-negative, we can re-write the instability condition
as follows.
−1 > 1− α− β
σ
· N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1)
⇐⇒ α− 2 > −β
σ
· N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1)
⇐⇒ σ < β
2− α · N
(
Φ−1
(
1− n
m
)∣∣∣0, 1)
In other words, for sufficiently small σ, the equilibrium is unstable.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the Gaussian distribution yields attractive equi-
libria in undesirable positions, whereas the desirable equilibria are unstable for a wide range
of conditions.
